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Can Food-for-Work Programmes Reduce Vulnerability?‡ 
 
Christopher B. Barrett, Stein Holden  
and Daniel C. Clay 
 
Food-for-work (FFW) programmes are widely touted for their capacity to target poor 
populations effectively with a reliable safety net, thereby reducing vulnerability due to 
downside risk exposure, while simultaneously investing in the production or 
maintenance of valuable public goods necessary to stimulate productivity and thus 
growth in aggregate incomes. The empirical evidence is mixed, however, as to the 
efficacy of FFW in any of these dimensions. Proponents cite cases in which FFW 
appears to have performed as intended, while opponents present evidence of its failures. 
The development community needs to guard against uncritical acceptance of either 
naïve or hostile claims about FFW and to develop a better understanding of how, when 
and why FFW programmes can indeed reduce vulnerability. This paper aims to advance 
such an understanding.  
There exist two distinct, important layers to the question of FFW’s efficacy. First, there 
is the short-run question of whether FFW effectively cushions people who suffer 
transitory income shocks. Does FFW, as a mechanism for emergency relief, provide an 
effective safety net, mitigating the adverse welfare effects of adverse real income 
shocks, especially those suffered by persons beneath or near the poverty line? The 
answer here turns largely on targeting and timing. In order to provide effective 
insurance, FFW has to reach those who suffer serious shocks quickly, before serious 
undernourishment and associated health problems set in. Yet transitory hunger 
associated with short-term crises represents a relatively small share of hunger 
worldwide, with estimates ranging 10–25 per cent (Speth 1993, Barrett 2002). Most 
malnutrition in the world arises due to chronic deprivation and vulnerability. So in so 
far as FFW is often aimed, instead, at relieving chronic deprivation and vulnerability, 
insurance against transitory income shocks may not always be the appropriate 
benchmark against which to evaluate FFW. 
This leads naturally to the second, longer-run question of whether FFW, as an 
instrument for development, improves livelihoods, either by accelerating recovery from 
shocks – as in the case of post-conflict rehabilitation – or by fostering income growth 
and wealth accumulation among the chronically destitute. Does or can FFW facilitate 
investment, innovation and access to new, attractive opportunities?  
If the former function is commonly thought of as a safety net to catch those who are 
falling, the latter function is akin to a cargo net. People can either climb up it or be lifted 
up by it. The two functions can obviously be effectively linked, as when an effective 
safety net obviates beneficiaries’ need to liquidate productive assets so as to finance 
essential current consumption, thereby enabling them to resume productive activities 
soon after the emergency ends and to climb quickly back out of poverty. There is also 
the less attractive possibility of people becoming ensnared in the safety net, when the 
relief function undermines the development function by diverting resources. The central 
questions about FFW are therefore whether it helps individuals, households and 
communities in times of stress and whether it (also) facilitates the desired transition 
from relief to development, i.e. whether FFW reduces vulnerability in the short-term, 
the long-term, both, or neither.  
We try to get at this core question through review of our own and others’ work on FFW, 
drawing mainly on empirical evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, especially Ethiopia 
and Kenya. FFW programs have been active elsewhere in the developing world, 
especially in south and southeast Asia.  But the basic features and issues are the same 
worldwide and we focus on those geographic areas from whence we know the evidence 
best.  We begin by reviewing the context that has given rise to rapid diffusion of FFW 
schemes in low-income areas around the world and the simple theory that makes it so 
conceptually appealing. We illustrate the potential with examples of FFW successes. 
Then we identify conceptual problems with the simple theory of FFW, likewise 
illustrating these points with empirical evidence of failures. The concluding section 
draws out the core lessons to be learned. 
1 The appeal of food-for-work: a simple theory and some evidence  
FFW has become increasingly popular over the past decade, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Devereux 1999, von Braun et al. 1999). The government of Ethiopia, for 
example, has expressed a commitment to channel 80 per cent of its food assistance 
resources to FFW programmes (FDRE 1996). Several trends have jointly contributed to 
food-for-work’s sharp growth in popularity over the past generation. These merit brief 
review. 
First, at least since Sen’s (1981) seminal work two decades ago, policymakers and 
researchers have come to understand hunger as being largely determined by individuals’ 
capacity to maintain access to sufficient food to maintain good nutrition, and thereby 
good health, and much less as a function of local food supply shocks than had been 
previously believed. Partly as a consequence, FFW schemes have blossomed as regular 
transfer programmes in chronic food deficit regions as a means of ensuring access to 
food. Second, in both domestic and international poverty interventions, broad-based 
concern has emerged about offering benefits without requiring programme participants 
to work, leading to a gradual shift from transfers to workfare programmes worldwide. 
Third, increasing distrust of central government and belief in the subsidiarity principle1 
have fuelled decentralization efforts in myriad public activities. Fourth, the end of the 
Cold War and growing dissatisfaction with foreign aid have led to a sharp decline in 
development assistance and a rapid rise in the share of overseas aid consumed by 
emergencies (Barrett and Carter 2001), although some ‘emergencies’ prove relatively 
permanent, as in the Greater Horn of Africa region on which we concentrate. Declining 
foreign assistance volumes have made cash resources increasingly scarce; food is now 
often the most readily available form of assistance to international charities and 
developing country governments.  
Together, these trends have given rise to ‘developmental food aid’, of which food-for-
work is a primary modality. In essence, FFW aims (i) to provide participants with at 
least the minimum essential quantity of food necessary to maintain good nutrition, (ii) to 
require work in exchange for this benefit, (iii) to reduce or decentralize both the 
targeting of beneficiaries and the prioritization and management of public works 
projects, and (iv) to harness the few resources available, in the form in which they are 
available (food), to try to maintain a modicum of development activity in the face of 
overwhelming relief demands. Among relief and development practitioners, one hears 
plenty of loose ideas as to how and why FFW should, or does, work. From these, one 
can fashion a simple, informal theory of FFW that runs as follows. 
Assume all individuals consider leisure a normal good (i.e. demand for leisure increases 
with income), that the opportunity cost of time – as reflected by one’s wage or salary 
rate, for example – likewise increases with income, and that everyone faces the same 
market prices for food, capital, land, and other goods and services. Under these 
assumptions, an unrestricted offer of employment at a low wage rate should be self-
targeting in the sense that the characteristics of the transfer suffice to create incentives 
for participation that vary across individuals. In particular, because the cost of 
participation is made an increasing function of one’s pre-participation income or wealth, 
only the needy should find project participation attractive, even absent any 
administrative restrictions on programme participation.  
By creating demand for otherwise unemployed or underemployed labour, FFW provides 
an income transfer to such persons. This is the first sense in which FFW serves short-
term relief objectives. This familiar, Keynesian function can be important even in the 
absence of shocks, for example by smoothing out seasonal fluctuations in labour 
demand, and therefore wage rates, in rural areas where rainfall patterns and insufficient 
irrigation preclude year-round crop cultivation.  
The open-ended nature of the programme provides insurance against transitory income 
shocks through the guarantee of a minimum income to all who are willing to work. So 
for people who lose their jobs, suffer crop failure or livestock loss on their own farms, 
or otherwise face a sudden decrease in labour productivity and thus income and welfare, 
FFW offers a plausible safety net. This is the second sense in which FFW has short-term 
relief objectives. It provides transfers equal to the difference between the (unobserved) 
next-best option for self-selected programme participants that can be accessed on short 
notice. Such insurance is especially important for those lacking access to liquid savings 
or to credit, i.e. to most of the rural poor in the world. Absent such insurance, their 
response to significant transitory income shocks typically involves coping behaviours 
such as migration, sale of productive assets such as land or livestock, or sharp reduction 
in consumption of food or health services. These strategies often compromise one’s 
future income prospects, thereby turning what might otherwise be a transitory income 
shock into a permanent one. Such phenomena give rise to stochastic poverty traps and 
chronic destitution (McPeak and Barrett 2001, Barrett 2002). Moreover, when 
agricultural labour productivity falls, small farmers often reallocate labour to activities 
that adversely affect the natural environment, such as deforestation, wildlife poaching 
and soil nutrient mining (Barrett and Arcese 1998, Barrett 1999, Barrett et al. 2002). 
Providing back-up employment to absorb transitorily surplus labour before it generates 
negative environmental externalities safeguards community assets. This is the first sense 
in which FFW has a long-term role as a cargo net; people may fall, but they can climb 
back up without injuring others if insurance in the form of fallback employment is 
available.  
The second sense in which FFW can serve long-term development objectives is 
similarly linked to its (first) short-run function. By providing predictable transfers, FFW 
can obviate binding seasonal liquidity constraints. Many small farmers around the world 
run short of the cash necessary to purchase food, pay hired workers and purchase inputs 
in the planting and growing season, popularly termed the ‘hungry’ season in many 
areas. The marginal cost of capital can be quite high, sufficient to preclude purchase of 
high-return inputs such as chemical fertilizer or investment in capital improvements 
such as improved soil and water conservation structures or labour-intensive cultivation 
practices exhibiting sharply increased expected crop yields (Moser and Barrett 2001, 
Barrett et al. 2002). 
In theory, the self-targeting feature of FFW reduces administrative targeting expenses, 
thereby allowing not only a higher rate of programme participation, but also greater 
expenditure on materials that, when combined with the labour elicited by the FFW 
programme, produce durable assets of value to the community. In so far as capital 
scarcity limits the productivity of the poor, production of public capital goods such as 
roads, natural resources, schools and health clinics can increase the future income 
prospects of all community members, FFW programme participants and non-
participants alike. The creation of capital goods though FFW programmes is the second 
potential long-term benefit of FFW; like a cargo net, it can prospectively lift the poor 
out of poverty.  
Some conjecture that collective investment in public goods through FFW programmes 
may also strengthen community ties and thereby build valuable social capital. Scholars 
of community development describe collective action, along with trust, reciprocity, and 
effective networks, as fundamental to the generation of social capital essential to the 
production and maintenance of public goods (Flora 1997). Flora concludes that the most 
successful mobilization of collective action will occur when participation is diverse and 
inclusive, suggesting a silver lining to targeting errors that result in beneficiary 
diversity. Indeed, as Sharp (1997) reports in her review of food aid targeting in 
Ethiopia, many communities consciously invite participation from needy as well as non-
needy households in their FFW programmes in the interest of developing greater 
community ownership and commitment. 
The preceding logic describes workfare programmes of all types (Clay 1986, Ravallion 
1991, Besley and Coate 1992, von Braun 1995, Ravallion 1999). FFW programmes are 
effectively workfare with a specific form of payment: food. One of the central questions 
about FFW’s efficacy thus turns on the appropriateness of payment in kind.  
There are two conditions under which food seems a desirable form of payment from the 
beneficiaries’ viewpoint.2 First, where hyperinflation prevails, food can be a very 
effective payment medium since it retains its real value in the face of rapidly changing 
nominal prices. Second, by explicitly interlinking labour and food markets, FFW may 
reduce transaction costs where food markets perform relatively poorly, thereby 
increasing access to food (Holden and Shanmugaratnam 1995, Holden and Binswanger 
1998). This latter condition is most likely to hold in food deficit regions where spatial 
arbitrage occurs slowly, at best, in response to local increases in demand. In such 
settings, cash wages may increase food availability for programme participants less than 
it fuels nominal food price increases – rather than increased food supply – with the dual 
effect of failing to provide significant net transfers to participants and adversely 
affecting non-participants locally. Such spillover damages will most hurt poorer non-
participants because they typically spend a larger share of income on food than do 
wealthier non-participants. Errors of exclusion of the poor – which we discuss in detail 
below – are especially damaging if the program design fuels local food price rises.  
Payment in food, by contrast, ensures labourers’ ability to replenish the energy 
expended in work without hurting non-participants. So where food markets function 
poorly and significant numbers of poor people do not participate in public employment 
schemes, FFW may be a far more pro-poor design than cash for work. 
It should also be pointed out that if the food is purchased locally, then the extra local 
demand stimulus benefits net food sellers in the area.3 If the food is imported from 
outside the area – FFW programmes are commonly supplied through international food 
aid – then FFW distribution almost surely displaces some local purchases, thereby 
depressing local prices and creating adverse supply disincentives for local farmers. 
Nonetheless, the trucks that haul food in typically do not return empty, so the additional 
backhaul transport supply fostered by imported food can provide a de facto marketing 
subsidy to farmers and others who export product from the region, thereby mitigating 
whatever adverse local food market effects result from FFW distributions. Moreover, 
induced food price reductions benefit food buyers, especially poorer non-participants 
because they typically spend a larger share of income on food than do wealthier non-
participants. 
Whether FFW works as popularly theorized is, of course, an empirical question, and one 
that has not yet been thoroughly and adequately answered. The simple theory just 
outlined points to five key testable hypotheses related to: (i) targeting efficacy – 
including timing of deliveries – because targeting determines both whether FFW indeed 
proves a pro-poor transfer, as intended, and, derivatively, the extent of any adverse local 
producer price effects due to substitution for commercially purchased food, (ii) the 
extent to which accurately timed and targeted FFW transfers prove sufficient to pre-
empt potentially injurious coping behaviours, including liquidation of productive assets, 
long-distance migration, and sharply reduced food consumption that increases the risk 
of irreversible injury, illness or death, (iii) FFW’s impact in relieving binding working 
capital constraints and thereby stimulating participant investment or adoption of 
improved technologies, (iv) whether FFW in fact produces durable public goods of 
value to local communities, which can include not only physical infrastructure, but also 
a tradition of cooperative activity and development of local leadership and management 
skills, and (v) whether or not imported foodstuffs relieve transport bottlenecks, thereby 
reducing marketing costs for local exporters through a de facto transport subsidy. 
As yet, there is insufficient empirical evidence on these five hypotheses to be able to 
make any global statements as to the efficacy of FFW interventions. Sufficient evidence 
exists, however, to be able to draw provisional conclusions on some of the points, 
particularly those regarding hypotheses (i), (iii) and (iv). We therefore focus hereafter 
on those points especially.  
1.1 FFW commonly generates pro-poor transfers 
The workfare literature more generally, including the sub-literature on FFW, finds 
strong pro-poor effects of public employment programmes, even once one takes the 
opportunity cost of participants’ foregone private employment earnings into 
consideration. Previous empirical research has found significant pro-poor transfers 
resulting from employment guarantee schemes in Argentina, Bangladesh, India, Niger, 
South Africa, and Zimbabwe, among others, as reflected by probabilities of or net 
transfers from participation that decline in income or wealth (Dev 1995, von Braun 
1995, Webb 1995, Subbarao 1997, Clay et al. 1998, Ravallion 1999, Atwood et al. 
2000, Haddad and Adato 2001, Jalan and Ravallion 2001). Part of this success appears 
to be due to the self-targeting feature of these schemes. Part may also arise due to the 
decentralization inherent to public employment programmes. If local officials have 
superior access to information regarding prospective participants’ welfare, devolution of 
targeting authority to local levels may well result in better targeting than could be 
expected on the basis of proxy indicators typically used by central governments 
(Alderman forthcoming). 
Transfers in the form of food also work well in areas where the cash economy is a 
man’s world while food is the responsibility of women, no matter who procures it. In 
such cultural settings and if intrahousehold resource competition exists, then food may 
be a more effective medium than cash for indirect targeting of transfers to needy 
beneficiaries, particularly children. This matters in many areas, especially where 
cultural mores dictate that distributions are almost always to men, as in some Islamic 
communities familiar to us in the Greater Horn of Africa. 
1.2 FFW relieves liquidity constraints 
The need for public provision of insurance services, whether through FFW or other 
means, arises directly from financial markets failures. So part of any salutary effect of 
FFW transfers should come from their impact on participants’ financial liquidity. By 
reducing households’ need to purchase food – and often providing cash indirectly 
through food that beneficiaries subsequently sell – FFW indeed seems to help foster 
greater net investment in other productive assets than might otherwise occur, whether in 
natural capital through new soil conservation investments (Barrett et al. 2002) or 
adoption of improved inputs or production technologies (Bezuneh et al. 1988, von 
Braun 1995). The effect may be subtle, appearing not as increased investment, but 
rather as reduced disinvestment, whether of valuable natural capital through erosion-
inducing deforestation (Barrett 1999) or sale of high return assets, such as livestock, to 
meet short-term cash requirements for food, medicines or school fees (Barrett et al. 
2001). The clear indication of FFW’s effect on relieving binding constraints is that the 
income gains associated with participation exceed the value of the food received, 
signalling that binding liquidity or subsistence constraints otherwise restricted 
participants’ livelihood choice, as seems to have been true in lower Baringo District, 
Kenya (Barrett et al. 2001). FFW may not be a first-best transfer were cash transfers a 
feasible alternative (it typically is not politically feasible). Yet, FFW provides a transfer, 
thereby relieving these constraints and permitting improved livelihoods.  
1.3 FFW projects can produce valuable public goods 
Ethiopia has the largest FFW programme in Africa, the vast majority of which has been 
channelled into investment in natural resource conservation and road building. Although 
there are ample cases of failed projects – more on this below – it is equally true that 
some projects have generated public goods of lasting value. For example, von Braun et 
al. (1999) report on the multiplier effects of a FFW-built road in the Ethiopian lowlands, 
where improved market access directly attributable to that road led to the establishment 
of water mills and fruit plantations and the revival of traditional cotton spinning and 
weaving in the three years after the road was built. Well-conceived and managed FFW 
projects that invest in necessary materials to complement labour inputs clearly can 
‘crowd in’ private investment, just as proponents claim. 
2 Problems with the simple theory and some evidence 
In spite of clear signs of some successes with FFW, their efficacy has come under 
increased scrutiny of late as evidence on programme shortcomings accumulates. 
Beyond providing a helpful reminder that FFW is not a cure-all for vulnerability in the 
developing world, this evidence helps reveal problems with the simple theory sketched 
out in the previous section. A more qualified understanding of how FFW operates in the 
complex settings in which it is deployed can help identify contexts in which it is most 
likely to prove helpful. The next section addresses those lessons learned. First we 
examine a series of problems identifiable in the simple theory of FFW. 
2.1 Targeting errors 
While the empirical evidence largely supports the claim that FFW – and self-targeting 
employment schemes more broadly – generates pro-poor distributions, as discussed 
earlier, targeting errors can nonetheless be great. One can usefully identify two distinct 
types of targeting errors: errors of inclusion, wherein benefits are enjoyed by unintended 
participants, and errors of exclusion, related to target subpopulations’ failure to 
participate. A central problem in project evaluation and the scholarly literature 
surrounding workfare and FFW programmes stems from the conflation of ex ante 
poverty with the experience of transitory real income shocks. FFW programmes can 
provide regular, in-kind transfers to poor, food-deficit populations, provide insurance to 
those suffering short-term welfare shocks, or both. With surprisingly few exceptions 
(e.g. Dercon and Krishnan 2001), little attention has been paid to targeting efficacy as it 
relates to the consumption smoothing rather than the poverty reducing effects of FFW. 
Since most donors and analysts are interested in the efficacy of the insurance function 
primarily, if not exclusively, as it relates to the poor, the distinction is perhaps not of 
great importance to most readers. But it is nonetheless worth keeping in mind that 
finding that any transfer program – be it FFW or some other form – reaches the poor is 
not the same as finding that it effectively insures against real income shocks, nor vice 
versa.  It is important to have the true objectives of the program firmly in mind before 
embarking on analysis of targeting efficacy. 
First, we consider the problem of errors of inclusion. Several recent studies have found 
evidence that many non-poor participate in FFW schemes (Clay et al. 1999, Devereux 
1999, Jayne et al. 1999, Teklu and Asefa 1999, Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000). One 
common explanation of errors of inclusion is that the FFW wages were set too high, 
inducing substitution of money wage work in the local labour market for FFW work, 
and thereby limiting the additionality of the FFW transfer since it largely substitutes for 
other income that would have been earned in the project’s absence (Ravallion et al. 
1993, von Braun 1995, Teklu and Asefa 1999). Moreover, when wages are set too high, 
project managers commonly face excess labour supply and have to ration participation 
in some fashion. There are good reasons to believe that local elites enjoy a higher 
probability of selection for participation than do outcasts.4  
Perhaps the most discouraging form of errors of inclusion relate to ghost workers.  
Unfortunately, FFW programs (and public employment schemes more generally), have 
a checkered history of fraud and waste due to lack of enforcement of work requirements 
under the program.  Project monitoring and evaluation efforts in various countries in 
Africa and Asia have commonly uncovered evidence of significant numbers of ghost 
workers who were paid for a day’s labor but who never actually reported to work, of 
idle-but-present workers, and of work days only half the length of the agreed labor 
requirement.  
Errors of exclusion are intrinsically related to errors of inclusion. In some cases this is 
because intended recipients get crowded out by participating elites. Other times, finite 
transfer resources limit the geographic reach of the programme to a few administratively 
selected locations (Devereux 1999, Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000). The common 
feature of these explanations of the targeting deficiencies of FFW is the suggestion that 
targeting errors can be corrected by a change in operational methods: a lower FFW 
wage, closer auditing of employment roles, a larger budget to expand geographic 
coverage, etc.  
The evidence suggests, however, that errors of exclusion and inclusion in FFW targeting 
are due at least as much to structural issues as to operational details. For example, 
results from a study of food aid targeting in Ethiopia in 1995/96 (Clay et al. 1999) 
provide empirical confirmation for a growing body of anecdotal evidence reported by 
Sharp (1997) demonstrating the frequent inability of Ethiopia’s food aid system to target 
the most needy populations, despite its heavy reliance on FFW.5 Clay et al. (1999) 
examine the food aid receipts of 4,218 rural households in 1995/96 and conclude that 
food aid targeting exhibits high errors of exclusion and inclusion at both the wereda 
(district) and household levels.6 The primary beneficiaries of food aid programmes, 
including FFW, were found to be households at the extremes in terms of ex ante food 
availability: those with the least and those with the most.  
Several factors account for the high level of targeting error in the Ethiopian case. First, a 
disproportionate number of female and aged heads of households receive food aid, 
irrespective of their food needs. Indicator targeting is an established method in the 
absence of detailed information on prospective recipients’ need and resources, but it 
commonly leads to significant targeting errors nonetheless (Barrett 2002).  
Second, FFW can only assist those physically able to work. Since physical disability is 
strongly, positively correlated with poverty and vulnerability in the low-income world, 
FFW by construction cannot serve all the poor. As long as the proportion of the poor 
who are able-bodied is reasonably large, this is not a serious constraint. In some places, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, work requirements pose an increasing challenge to 
reaching the poor because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As more able-bodied adults fall 
prey to the disease or need to devote considerable time at home to caring for sick loved 
ones, this problem is exploding. By sharply increasing the population of poor people 
unable to work, HIV/AIDS is reducing the potential scope of FFW as both a safety net 
and as a development intervention. The same is true in post-conflict settings where 
many of the needy are amputees, blinded, or otherwise permanently incapacitated by the 
war and where many households are now headed by widows. In Cambodia, the country 
with the world’s highest proportion of population with amputations, errors of omission 
have proved to be extremely large in FFW projects because the injured and widows 
typically are unable or unwilling to participate (David Pottebaum, personal 
communication). 
Third, the accuracy of the self-targeting component of food-for-work schemes may be 
fundamentally limited by factor market failures affecting the nature of local labour 
supply in low-income agrarian settings. Factor markets in land, labour and capital are 
often incomplete in poor, rural economies, so labour and cultivable land do not 
necessarily move freely between households so as to equalize (quality-adjusted) 
land/labour ratios. Therefore household reservation FFW wage rates – the threshold 
wage that induces self-selection into the programme – need not be strongly, inversely 
related to household pre-transfer income unconditionally, as the conventional wisdom 
assumes, but rather may increase with income only conditional on other structural 
factors – in particular, the composition of households’ productive asset endowments – 
that influence shadow wage rates. Barrett and Clay (2003) demonstrate this in the 
1995/96 Ethiopia data, showing that elicited reservation wages – which are unrelated to 
operational details such as programme wage rates or administrative selection criteria – 
have no significant unconditional relationship to income, but a strong relationship once 
one controls for (imperfectly tradable) productive asset holdings. The poor are too often 
assumed to be more ‘labour rich’ than those with higher incomes. In many settings, this 
is not true.  As a consequence, lowering wage rates induces self-selection out of the 
program by the poor.  Barrett and Clay (2003) report that even at a daily wage of five 
kilograms of wheat – which is higher than the norm in FFW programs in Ethiopia – 
nearly half of the lowest income quintile self-selects out of FFW programs.  Many of 
Ethiopia’s able-bodied poor appear to have better uses for their time than participation 
in low-wage FFW programs.  Yet, raising FFW wages both reduces the number of 
prospective beneficiaries, due to the budget constraint, and induces increased errors of 
inclusion.  Barrett and Clay (2003) find that the participation probability of a household 
with income equal to twice the sample median is at least 80 percent of the participation 
probability of a household in the lowest decile no matter the FFW wage rate.  The 
tradeoffs between errors of exclusion and errors of inclusion in FFW programs appear 
considerable. 
Female-headed households are commonly more labour constrained and thus less able or 
willing to participate in FFW projects, especially those requiring a high minimum level 
of effort. Although evidence from Bangladesh and India show high female participation 
rates in employment guarantee schemes in general and FFW projects in particular (von 
Braun 1995), evidence from elsewhere finds women often miss out on these 
opportunities (Clay et al. 1998, Barrett and Clay 2003). The archetypal case concerns 
widows with young children. These households commonly have incomes well below the 
mean but effective labour availability that is even lower. 
Fourth, inertia in the food aid delivery system seems to impede its ability to reach 
households outside of historically deficit areas (Jayne et al. 1999, 2001).7 Regular, in –
kind transfers into chronically food deficit areas may be effective as poverty reduction 
efforts and maintenance of some low level of ongoing activity in areas prone to 
recurring crises may help donors ‘ramp up’ in years when need becomes acute. 
Nevertheless, FFW projects developed legitimately in crisis years have been shown to 
build momentum that sustains them even during peaceful times and relatively good 
harvest years. In Ethiopia, for example, one of the strongest determinants of household 
level food aid receipts is the number of years in the past that communities and 
households within these communities have received such assistance, independent of the 
actual need for food in these communities/households (Clay et al. 1999, Jayne et al. 
1999).  
It may be that inertia-related targeting errors reflect authorities’ redistributive 
objectives, which may be unrelated to need. Political economy considerations certainly 
account for a significant share of targeting errors of food distribution at the level of 
nation states (Barrett 1998, 2001), and surely play a role within countries and 
communities as well.   
It is also likely that inertia can be at least partly attributed to the progressive build-up of 
institutional capacity in the food aid delivery system over time, notably the investments 
made by government agencies and NGOs in such things as personnel, contacts and 
knowledge of the area, offices, trucks, and institutional reputation. Because of the 
tremendous flow and momentum built up in the food aid delivery system, altering its 
course to meet the needs of deficit households in other areas that may not benefit from 
the same extent of infrastructure and institutionalization, has become a formidable 
challenge. Given significant sunk costs to food distribution, it may be optimal to limit 
flexibility to respond to intertemporal changes in need across locations, or even 
households within a location. It may simply be too expensive to respond to fluctuating 
needs accurately and promptly. Oftentimes, however, the field staff expert in the 
logistics of food distribution, who are essential to run a good short-term safety net 
operation, remain in place over the longer term and must try to make themselves over as 
development experts, a process that unsurprisingly often fails. 
In some cases, national governments, participating donor organizations, and the NGOs 
charged with implementing food aid programmes, have sought to legitimize inertia in 
food aid programming by reengineering programmes originally implemented for 
purposes of emergency relief into instruments of ‘development.’ The emergence of 
FFW programmes in Ethiopia since the 1984/85 drought seems to demonstrate this 
evolution most aptly. Ethiopia’s National Policy on Disaster Prevention and 
Management (NPDPM) now states that disaster relief should ensure adequate income 
transfer for disaster affected households, promote self-reliance among beneficiaries, 
preserve assets to promote speedy recovery, be geared to eliminate the root causes of 
disaster vulnerability, and contribute to sustainable development (TGE 1993a,b). Any 
one of those aspirations poses serious challenges. Meeting them all is a tall order 
indeed. 
2.2 Timing errors 
The timing of food provision is an oft-overlooked element of targeting. FFW must be 
available quickly in response to adverse shocks if it is to function effectively as a safety 
net, in particular, for it to kick in before beneficiaries are forced to divest themselves of 
productive assets in their quest to meet current consumption needs. Rapid response 
depends on getting the administrative and logistical machinery for food distribution in 
place early. This is another sense in which inertia may be beneficial, although 
Botswana’s successful experiences with FFW projects that expand and contract 
radically in response to need indicate that administrative capacity is the key, not 
ongoing FFW programmes (von Braun et al. 1999). Nonetheless, inertia in food aid 
distribution likely helps explain the relatively good performance of FFW programmes in 
Tigray during the 2000 drought, for they were in place and functional before the rains 
fell.  
The capacity to launch new FFW programmes or to expand existing ones in response to 
shocks depends on the availability of food in emergency response systems, whether by 
virtue of advanced positioning of food stocks, as in strategic grain reserves, or by 
prompt requisition and delivery of food aid in response to early warnings systems, as 
has occurred in southern Africa during the last two El Niño events. Failure to ensure 
sufficient supply in emergency distribution channels can lead to serious delays, as has 
been routinely a problem in Sudan over the past decade. This problem was evident as 
well in south-eastern Ethiopia during the 2000 drought, when donors upset with the 
government about the Ethiopia-Eritrea war manifest their displeasure through a delayed 
and miserly response to an emergency appeal that had been forewarned a year in 
advance.8 Food aid in general does not have a track record of timely response to 
fluctuating need, although there is evidence that multilateral distribution through the 
World Food Programme responds reasonably promptly to changing local food 
production and commercial food import capacity, albeit in modest magnitude due to 
limited resources (Barrett and Heisey 2002).  
Timing matters for at least two reasons. First, untimely food distribution can magnify 
rather than dampen variability in household dietary energy supply and in local food 
prices. Unpublished quarterly data collected from 177 pastoralist households in northern 
Kenya during the devastating 2000 drought indicate that food aid receipts peaked as 
non-concessional food availability from other sources recovered. Second, disruptions 
and delays in the provision or distribution of food can undermine participant confidence 
in the programme – thereby inducing intended beneficiaries to self-select out of FFW – 
quality of works, or both (Sharp 1997).  
2.3 Wages: flexibility and form 
We have already discussed how wage rates set too high can induce targeting errors, both 
by eliciting participation by unintended beneficiaries and by exhausting programme 
budgets too quickly, thereby leading to errors of exclusion. It is also true, however, that 
FFW wages must be sufficient to reproduce the physical energy of the labourer. Where 
private labour demand is weak, prevailing market wage rates may be very low already. 
Indeed, wage rates for part-time casual labour, especially during the hungry season, may 
be marginal supplements to households whose average labour productivity is higher due 
to self-employment on- or off-farm. Under such circumstances, market wage rates may 
prove insufficient to sustain the health of fully employed FFW labourers.9 This is of 
special concern for female programme participants, who may be more likely to share 
earned rations with family members, especially their children. In a study for CARE in 
Ethiopia McCaston (1991) found that women on FFW exhibited deteriorating body 
mass indices – the primary adult anthropometric indicator of nutritional status – because 
they shared rations calculated so as just to reproduce the worker’s energy expenditures. 
The other principle issue concerning wages relates to the form of payment. Should 
workers be paid in food or in cash? We earlier offered arguments as to when it seems 
appropriate to pay wages in food. The empirical evidence in favour of payment in kind 
is limited, however. One issue concerns the extra costs of transport and handling of 
food, relative to cash wages. Estimates in Bangladesh found that cash wages would 
reduce total programme costs by 25 per cent compared to food wages (Clay et al. 1998). 
Given binding budget constraints that limit coverage, too often leading to significant 
errors of exclusion, one must be able to demonstrate that these added costs are worth 
bearing.  
The second issue related to payment form concerns the fungibility premium participants 
put on cash over food receipts. Barrett and Clay (2003) find that at low wage rates, up to 
the equivalent of two kilograms per day of wheat (less than prevailing market wage 
rates), households’ willingness to participate in FFW projects is invariant to payment 
form in Ethiopia. Thereafter, however, the premium associated with payment in cash 
jumps. Above a low threshold, far more people will participate in a programme if the 
wage is paid in cash rather than its equivalent in food. This premium ranges from  
12 to 65 per cent, depending on the wage rate offered. This reflects both the need poor 
people have for cash for other purposes, such as medicines, school fees, or loan 
repayments – and the transactions costs they incur selling food to meet these cash 
requirements – and the errors of inclusion inherent to FFW programmes, wherein food 
surplus households may be relatively labour rich and therefore willing to work for food 
wages that merely increase their net sales. Northern Kenyan elders tell us routinely that 
only 50–80 per cent of received grain food aid is consumed as food. Recipients, they 
say, use the rest as seed, livestock feed or to make home brew.10 Whether FFW is 
intended as a regular transfer to the chronic poor or as an insurance buffer for those 
suffering shocks, food is not always the form in which people most need assistance. 
2.4 Quality of public goods created 
We previously acknowledged that some FFW projects have been shown to generate 
valuable public goods. This should not, however, be taken for granted. As any 
experienced municipal official can attest, production of durable public goods is no 
simple matter. It takes cooperation within the community, management skills, and 
significant non-labour inputs. These ingredients are not always available to FFW 
projects. Where FFW is being used as part of post-conflict rehabilitation, community 
cooperation can prove especially elusive, as has proved true in Cambodia (Sakko 1999). 
Since project officers with implementing NGOs are typically selected for their skills at 
managing food distribution, not at public works project management, necessary human 
capital is often missing. Moreover, given that one factor driving the rise of FFW has 
been the increased scarcity of non-food resources from donors, finding funds to 
purchase complementary inputs has grown increasingly difficult for FFW project 
managers. Finally, there is commonly a trade-off between locating projects where the 
need to provide short-term relief in response to shocks or long-term transfers to combat 
poverty are greatest versus where logistical feasibility (e.g. access to transport 
infrastructure to deliver food and supplies) and geophysical suitability for resource 
conservation or road construction projects (Atwood et al. 2000, Gebremedhin and 
Swinton 2001).  
As a direct consequence of these factors, the assets created using FFW labour are all too 
often inappropriate, of poor quality, or not maintained. For example, a review of 
CIDA’s FFW programmes in Ethiopia found no evidence of a sustainable long-term 
increase in household-level food security due to the assets created by FFW projects, 
whether due to poor choice, quality or upkeep of investments (Clay et al. 1998). 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2001) find evidence of compromises in central Tigray, 
Ethiopia, 1992–95, with project feasibility typically trumping both needs targeting and 
expected investment returns in determining project location. 
When investments require relatively little in the way of non-labour variable inputs, there 
may be no trade-off between the short-run, safety net objective of FFW – to provide 
insurance to as many people as possible – that depends on employment generation, and 
the longer-run, cargo net objective – to increase incomes and reduce vulnerability – that 
depends on the efficacy of FFW investments. This has, for example, been an argument 
used to defend the emphasis placed on construction of soil and water conservation 
structures in Ethiopian FFW programmes.  Indeed, both econometric and simulation 
results from northern Ethiopia suggest that well-timed FFW projects that invest in soil 
and water conservation structures both help cushion the poor against yield shocks and 
induce private investment in land improvements that raise long-term agricultural 
productivity and incomes (Holden et al. 2003).   
There is little solid evidence, however, that labour-based methods are either better or 
worse than equipment-based methods in the construction of public works across the 
board. In the case of road construction, one of the more common investments of FFW 
programmes, Stock and DeVeen (1996) conclude that there is broad scope for using 
labour-based methods. However, the completion time using labour-based methods is 
often constrained by the availability and willingness of the local labour pool. And even 
labour-intensive designs commonly need some complementary inputs. In Zimbabwe, 
insufficient resources for non-wage inputs led to minimal asset creation, much wasted 
labour and thus negligible longer-term productivity gains from that nation’s extensive 
FFW programmes (von Braun et al. 1999). In Cambodia, the scope for labour-intensive 
public works proved much narrower once programmes were underway than proponents 
had initially anticipated (Sakko 1999). 
2.5 Crowding out private transfers 
Proponents of FFW often claim that it creates social capital by bringing individuals 
together in work teams on projects intended for collective benefit. We are unaware, 
however, of any solid empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis.11 Indeed, it 
seems that any observable positive correlation between social capital stocks and FFW 
performance is more likely due to the need for established community-level 
participation, leadership and cooperation in project identification, design and 
implementation. Von Braun et al. (1999), discussing relatively favourable FFW 
experiences in Botswana and Niger, Dev’s (1995) study of Bangladesh, and 
Molteberg’s (1997) report on the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), an Ethiopian NGO, 
all suggest that FFW is most effective in creating durable public investments of value 
where strong community work traditions prevail, local institutions exhibit effective 
organizational capacity, or both.  
One must also worry about the possibility that public transfers through FFW or other 
interventions may crowd out private transfers, thereby diminishing community 
cohesion. Albarran and Attanasio (2001) find evidence of crowding out of private 
transfers by public ones in Mexico and Cox and Jimenez (1992) find similar evidence in 
Peru. We are unaware of rigorous empirical work on this question in the narrower 
context of FFW. But our experience in pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia and northern 
Kenya suggest reason for caution. Where detailed ethnographic among the region’s 
pastoralists in the 1960s and 1970s described extensive, active networks of gifts, loans, 
and transfers among pastoralists to cushion people against shocks due to climate, 
disease or raiding, more recent data from the same areas show that transfers provide 
very little in the way of insurance against losses (Lybbert et al. 2001, McPeak 2001). 
Discussions with elders and long-time observers of the region consistently point to the 
emergence of ubiquitous food aid distribution, albeit more often as free food than as 
FFW in this particular region, as giving neighbours and extended family an excuse to 
reduce support for one another. If FFW and other public programmes do indeed displace 
private safety nets, a hypothesis still in need of careful testing, then the net benefits of 
these programmes are obviously less than they might appear through a simple 
accounting of programme beneficiaries, even after making adjustment for alternative 
private employment forsaken (Jalan and Ravallion 2000).  
The hypothesis that FFW may build social capital, posed in the previous section, may 
also cut the other way. When participation must be rationed, one all too frequently finds 
systematic exclusion of migrant returnees, particular ethnic groups or clans by the 
authorities responsible for choosing participants, with adverse consequences for social 
cohesion within the community. Moreover, once individuals have become accustomed 
to getting paid for contributions to community infrastructure, it can be more difficult to 
mobilize voluntary labour to contribute to the provision of local public goods, a problem 
decried frequently by both NGOs and community leaders in the Horn of Africa.12  An 
anonymous referee reinforces this point by describing how in Indonesia, customary self-
help activities in which people are expected to contribute time to community-based 
projects (gotong royong), may be undermined by public employment programs that now 
pay people (in cash or rice) for activities traditionally carried out as a public 
contribution.  FFW activities run the risk of subtly shifting the locus of responsibility 
for community action from community members themselves to outside agencies or 
government.  
2.6 Disincentive effects 
Economists and policymakers have long worried about the potential disincentive effects 
of giving away food, both because transfers may induce beneficiaries to reduce labour 
supply and that food transfers may substitute for commercial purchases, thereby 
depressing local food prices and reducing farmers’ incentives to produce and to invest 
in their land (intensification) and traders’ incentives to invest in marketing capital. The 
latter effect is intimately related to targeting errors because the extent of errors of 
inclusion directly affects the volume of commercial purchases displaced in the market.  
The empirical evidence on disincentive effects is nonetheless quite mixed. Much seems 
to turn on whether FFW is occasional (a safety net) or chronic (an ongoing employment 
programme with cash wages), whether it generates productive public goods (e.g. roads 
or soil conservation structures), and how well it is targeted to the truly needy. 
Jayne (1998) and Tschirley (1997) find evidence of FFW transfers reducing net food 
purchases at household level in Ethiopia and Mozambique, respectively. Mohapatra et 
al. (1999) caution, however, against inferences about net incentives to smallholder 
farmers on the basis of output price movements alone since FFW, and food aid 
distribution more generally, can also affect factor prices. We are unaware of any direct 
empirical study of FFW’s effect on food producers’ net profits. 
Using rapid appraisal and participatory ranking techniques in a single project in Damot 
Woyde, Ethiopia, in 1989, Maxwell et al. (1994) found no significant disincentive 
effects with respect to either labour supply or agricultural intensification. They attribute 
this favourable result to careful targeting – community targeting combined with self-
targeting – and to complementary encouragement of intensification by other means.  
By contrast, the 1995/96 national survey data from Ethiopia are consistent with the 
claim of significant disincentive effects. Table 1 shows that labour and land productivity 
are both sharply decreasing with households’ frequency of FFW participation. The 
differences between groups are highly statistically significant after controlling for farm 
size, level of intensification, livestock ownership, region, rainfall, and characteristics of 
the head of household such as education, gender, and age.13 This is true as well of free 
food aid distribution, which would be consistent with the labour supply disincentive 
hypothesis. Unlike free food aid receipt, however, FFW is also strongly associated with 
reduced investment in agricultural intensification, including improved seed, chemical 
fertilizers, organic fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation technologies. Comparing mean 
intensification index scores, FFW non-participant households are far more likely to 
intensify than are chronic FFW households, with an average intensification score twice 
that of the chronic FFW participants.  
In the absence of defensible instruments we cannot conclusively dismiss the possibility 
of reverse causality, and it is surely true that poor productivity in some marginal areas 
causes food aid receipt, in particular chronic FFW participation. Programme placement 
effects appear significant in related work using different data from Ethiopia (Dercon and 
Krishnan 2001). We nonetheless think it important not to dismiss the disincentive effect 
argument entirely for three reasons. First, previous analysis (Clay et al. 1999, Barrett 
and Clay 2003) shows food aid distribution is not effectively targeted on the basis of 
poverty or household ex ante food availability, indicators that are more discernible by 
community and FFW project leaders than are labour or land productivity or 
intensification measures. Second, important differences emerge between free food aid 
and FFW in the level of income diversification and agricultural intensification observed 
although there is no difference in targeting efficacy between these two modalities. In 
particular, sustained receipt of free food is associated with greater off-farm employment 
and higher agricultural intensification than FFW. Third, data on farmer perceptions of 
their own practices (Table 2) show that FFW users are demonstrably more likely to 
perceive decreased labour availability on their farm and chronic FFW participants are 
substantially more likely to perceive a decrease in use of fertilizer and other non-labour 
variable inputs and in crop production overall, relative to recipients of free food aid. On 
average, in spite of clear, positive cases such that reported by Maxwell et al. (1994), 
Ethiopian farmers perceive and articulate a negative effect of FFW on their farms. 
Authentic programme placement effects not withstanding, farmers’ concerns deserve to 
be taken seriously. 
The same concerns are evident in other Ethiopian data. In a survey of 400 households in 
16 communities in Tigray in 1998, Hagos and Holden (1998) similarly found that 21 per 
cent of households stated that FFW participation gave them less time to look after their 
farm and animals, while only one percent said FFW participation gave them more time 
to look after their farm and animals. Forty-three percent stated that it reduced their need 
to produce own food and only four percent stated that it made them able to invest more 
on their own farms. The main investment effects of FFW are therefore likely to be the 
direct effects of FFW.  
Holden et al. (2001, 2003) explore the sensitivity of how household agricultural 
production and investment behavioural responses to transfers respond to alternative 
structural assumptions through a bioeconomic household model calibrated to survey 
data collected in Andit Tid, North Shewa, Amhara Region, Ethiopia. Andit Tit received 
food aid for the first time in 1999 after the belg season rains failed for the second 
consecutive year, a very unusual event. Their modelling exercise finds that production 
and investment incentives – and consequently food production, agricultural labour use, 
area cultivated, extent of conservation investments, and soil erosion outcomes – vary 
depending on structural assumptions about the initial yield effects of conservation 
technologies, households’ access to non-farm income, and whether FFW is used for 
conservation investment or not in the community. When FFW labour is channelled into 
productive public goods investment in soil conservation (through construction of bunds 
on farmland) and households enjoy unconstrained access to the labour market, FFW 
leads to greater agricultural production and increased conservation investment, as well 
as reduced land degradation due to erosion. When the opposite conditions hold, 
however, incentives to produce food and conserve the land are comprized by FFW. 
Although these are merely modelling results, not empirical observations, they are 
consistent with and help explain the variation one observes in case studies, where FFW 
appears to create favourable incentives in some settings, but disincentives to agricultural 
production or on-farm investment in others. The devil indeed seems to be in the local 
factor market details. 
3 Core lessons: how, when and why FFW works 
So can the competing evidence on FFW be reconciled adequately to generate some 
useful rules of thumb as to when, how and why FFW can serve effectively as short-term 
insurance, a longer-term rehabilitation and development intervention, or both? The 
evidence suggests a reasonably broad set of conditions under which FFW can perform 
effectively as a short-term safety net, a much narrower set of conditions under which it 
can also, or instead, advance longer-term ‘cargo net’ objectives related to development 
and rehabilitation. 
Reconciling short-run and long-run objectives is a first-order priority in the design of 
FFW programmes. Clay et al. (1998, p.19) assert that ‘public works projects cannot 
effectively achieve both [short-run and long-run] goals simultaneously and should 
generally have one or other as their primary objective.’ There are clear trade-offs 
between (i) wage payments and provision of complementary inputs to improve the 
quality of public works, and often between (ii) selecting project leaders skilled in short-
term relief operations or in longer-term development programming, and (iii) selecting 
programme sites based on logistical feasibility, expected returns to FFW public works, 
or immediate nutritional needs of local populations. There are circumstances under 
which food is the primary, occasionally the only, form in which resources are available 
for development efforts. In such cases, but probably only such cases, long-run 
objectives might legitimately take priority. As a general rule, however, FFW is most 
effective as a means of providing short-term insurance against shocks and, when 
carefully planned and implemented, can help rather than hinder longer-term recovery 
and development efforts. 
Efficacy in meeting short-run insurance objectives basically hinges on the issues of 
targeting and timing. Three key geographic criteria matter in FFW targeting. First, it is 
most appropriate in chronically food deficit zones that are relatively poorly integrated 
into the commercial food marketing network, else food is an undesirable form for 
making transfers and likely institutional inertia can lead to substantial targeting errors in 
subsequent years. If local food marketing systems perform spatial arbitrage reasonably 
efficiently and transport costs are not excessive, transfers in kind will be far more costly 
to donors and less desirable for most prospective beneficiaries than cash transfers. 
Second, FFW works best where private market demand for labour fails to provide a vent 
for surplus labour released by those who suffer shocks. If employment opportunities 
exist but food markets are weak, free food distribution will generally outperform FFW, 
which works best as a means of resolving multiple market failures in food and labour. 
Nonetheless, frictions caused by high transactions costs in land and capital markets can 
lead to considerable variation in the reservation wage rates at which households become 
willing to participate in FFW projects, thereby limiting the potential efficacy of self-
targeting. The very market failures that justify the use of FFW also limit its efficacy in 
reaching intended beneficiaries, a key limitation that must be kept in mind. 
Third, since FFW requires able-bodied participants, it is most effective in reaching 
vulnerable persons in areas with relatively low rates of chronic illness or injury, i.e., not 
in areas with severe HIV/AIDS or landmine injury problems. Together, these points 
imply subjecting FFW transfers to an initial geographic targeting based on the three 
criteria of food and labour market performance and general morbidity status. 
Both theory and the empirical evidence favour following up this three criteria 
geographic targeting with community targeting before relying on the self-targeting 
feature of FFW to determine programme participation. There are at least two reasons for 
the advisability of community targeting. First, the evidence suggests that although 
community-level targeting can lead to some errors of inclusion due to political 
patronage, the greater effect is improved targeting to the poor by taking advantage of 
local knowledge of households’ needs and capabilities that is difficult to capture in 
measurable indicators (Maxwell et al. 1994, von Braun et al. 1999, Alderman 
forthcoming). Such community targeting can help reduce the targeting errors that result 
from exclusive reliance on self-targeting in areas where factor market imperfections 
break down the theorized positive relationship between household income or wealth and 
reservation FFW participation wage (Barrett and Clay 2003). 
The second reason for community-level targeting is that active local participation and 
leadership in project identification, design and implementation matter to the ultimate 
efficacy of FFW and other employment programmes (Maxwell et al. 1994, Von Braun 
et al. 1999, Haddad and Adato 2001). Mitigation of the potential adverse medium-to-
long-term effects of FFW requires that attention be paid to the incentives created for 
agricultural intensification and labour supply patterns and to the choice and quality of 
the public goods created by the FFW effort. 
We stop short of recommending that community leadership and existing social capital 
be used as a fourth criterion in geographic targeting of FFW projects because there is 
insufficient evidence on which to conclude whether FFW and similar projects can create 
community capacity. Indeed, as previously discussed, public employment programs can 
even undermine extant community work norms.  Moreover, extant difficulties in the 
effective measurement of community leadership and social capital, combined with the 
likely political unacceptability of ranking communities by these characteristics, renders 
this criterion practically infeasible. Nonetheless, the likelihood of success in reaching 
intended beneficiaries at reasonable current and future cost is plainly greater in locations 
that do not suffer dysfunctional local politics.  
Timely delivery is crucial to any sort of public transfer scheme intended to insure poor 
subpopulations against loss of health, productive assets and, in the extreme, life. The 
experience of countries such as Botswana and of episodes like the last two El Niño 
events in southern Africa underscore the value of early warning systems and careful 
pre-planning by responsible government officials and cooperating donors and NGOs. 
FFW programmes need to be active or cued for operation in response to emerging need. 
If programme design commences with the onset of an emergency, it is almost surely too 
late for FFW to prove effective. There is much to be learned as well from the 
contrasting experiences of the World Food Programme, which relies heavily on local 
purchases and triangular transactions to source food for delivery to FFW programmes 
and whose food aid flows demonstrably stabilize food availability in recipient countries 
(Barrett and Heisey 2002), and the United States’ PL 480 programme, from which 
bilateral flows are procured in the United States, subject to considerable delays, and 
exhibit no discernible effect in responding effectively to fluctuating needs (Barrett 
2001). 
Reasonably accurate targeting matters for longer-term development purposes, as well. 
Otherwise, FFW rations displace commercial food purchases at an unacceptably high 
rate, driving down local prices and depressing investment incentives for farmers and 
food traders. Indeed, the disincentive effects of FFW are real threats if care is not taken 
to counteract them through explicit promotion of agricultural intensification and 
production of appropriate and durable public goods such as roads, schools, and soil and 
water conservation structures. Well-targeted FFW needs to be applied to the production 
or maintenance of public goods (i) in which local or national government would not 
otherwise be investing at present, (ii) that will be maintained satisfactorily thereafter, 
(iii) that can be produced at good quality by labour-intensive means, (iv) for which 
complementary non-labour inputs are readily available, and (v) about which local 
populations are enthusiastic. This is a tall order, but it is by no means infeasible. There 
are good cases of where this indeed works. A common denominator is almost always 
active community participation in the identification of project priorities. Local 
participation and commitment is essential to overcome moral hazard and information 
asymmetries between target populations and external agents. Failures of past FFW 
efforts may largely be due to a top-down approach where the programme administrators 
lacked the necessary information and local commitment needed to design and 
implement properly targeted, high quality programmes.  A central government with 
manifest institutional commitment and technical expertise to design and implement 
effective FFW programs following clear objectives and a simple design seems 
necessary to program effectiveness, but by no means sufficient.  Communities cannot 
run effective FFW projects in a vacuum, but central governments are typically unable to 
do so either absent strong collaboration with local jurisdictions and civil society. 
Looking to the bottom line, these points confirm that FFW is but one piece of the 
broader puzzle of insuring the poor against catastrophic loss. The heterogeneity of poor, 
food insecure people and the communities in which they reside necessitates a portfolio 
approach in which officials, donors and relief agencies on the ground can draw from a 
range of different instruments to respond to emerging needs. There is always danger in a 
‘one size fits all’ approach, and this is no less true of food-for-work than for any other 
type of intervention. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of labour and land productivity, income diversification,  
and agricultural intensification across levels of food aid use 
  Indicators of productivity, diversification, and intensification 
Type and level of food aid 
use 
N 
Labour 
productivity 
 
(Mean income in 
birr per unit of 
household labour) 
Land 
productivity 
 
(Mean farm 
income in birr 
per hectare of 
land) 
Income 
diversification 
 
(Mean % of total 
income received 
from off-farm 
sources) 
Agricultural 
intensification 
 
(Mean index 
score) 
Free food aid (FFA) use      
Non-users 2,345 679 2,053 7.8 0.99 
Intermittent users 768 586 1,771 6.6 0.72 
Chronic users 72 407 1,154 15.4 0.69 
ANOVA significance  #0.001 #0.01 #0.001 #0.001 
Food-for-work (FFW) use      
Non-users 2,574 679 2,049 7.5 0.94 
Intermittent users 567 534 1,658 8.5 0.82 
Chronic users 44 457 910 6.1 0.47 
ANOVA significance  #0.001 #0.001 0.052 #0.001 
Factors and covariates in 
ANOVA  
 
Factors: 
-region  
Covariates: 
-farm size 
-TLU 
-intensification 
-inc diversif. 
-age of head 
-sex of head 
-educ of head 
-rainfall 
 
Factors: 
-region 
Covariates: 
-HHlabour 
-farm size 
-TLU 
-intensification
-inc diversif. 
-age of head 
-sex of head 
-educ of head 
-rainfall 
Factors: 
-region 
Covariates: 
-Hhlabour 
-farm size 
-TLU 
-intensification 
-age of head 
-sex of head 
-educ of head 
-rainfall 
Factors: 
-region 
Covariates: 
-HHlabour 
-farm size 
-TLU 
-inc diversif. 
-age of head 
-sex of head 
-educ of head 
-rainfall 
 
 
Table 2 
Comparison of farmer perceptions of change 
by type and frequency of food aid use 
 
 Frequency and type of food aid received in past five years 
Perceived 
change due to 
food aid use 
Intermittent 
FFA only 
(%) 
Chronic FFA 
only 
(%) 
All combinations 
of FFA & FFW 
(%) 
Intermittent 
FFW only 
(%) 
Chronic FFW 
only 
(%) 
Household farm labour availability 
Decrease 7.1 11.1 25.1 24.8 25.8 
No change 84.1 76.9 68.3 70.4 70.2 
Increase 8.8 10.0 6.0 4.8 4.0 
            
Overall crop cultivation 
Decrease 18.0 28.1 26.9 19.0 41.5 
No change 63.8 65.5 57.9 65.3 42.3 
Increase 18.3 6.5 15.2 15.7 16.2 
            
Use of fertilizer and other variable Inputs 
Decrease 7.3 2.0 10.4 7.6 28.1 
No change 82.8 92.1 77.1 84.5 65.8 
Increase 9.9 5.9 10.4 7.9 6.1 
   
Number of 
observations 441 28 371 203 38 
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1 The principle of subsidiarity stipulates that authority and responsibility for actions be devolved to the 
lowest level capable of undertaking them effectively.  
2 Food may be the preferred transfer medium from donors’ viewpoint because they wish to stimulate food 
consumption, whether for commercial or impurely altruistic reasons (Barrett 2002). We ignore those 
considerations. 
3 We use the term ‘net food sellers’ rather than ‘food producers’ in recognition of the fact that a large 
share of small food producers in the low-income world are net food buyers. Although farming is their 
primary activity, meager endowments of land and capital and rudimentary production technologies 
conspire to leave them unable to meet their own household food demands (Weber et al. 1988, Barrett and 
Dorosh 1996). 
4 Herring and Edwards (1993) tell an interesting story of manipulation and corruption that arise due to the 
many different opportunities for local FFW managers to exercise discretion (e.g. over project duration, 
location, wage rates, payment terms, etc.) and how this may affect participation profiles, even in a 
seemingly successful programme like Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee Scheme. 
5 Sharp (1997) provides an excellent, broad-based discussion of food aid targeting in Ethiopia and the 
circumstances under which different methods appear to be relatively more or less successful, based on 
case studies of various food aid programmes and projects implemented in Ethiopia over the past several 
years.  
6 These household data derive principally from the Food Security Survey, implemented in June, 1996 by 
the Grain Market Research Project in collaboration with the Ethiopia Central Statistical Authority (CSA). 
The sample was randomly drawn as a subset of the CSA’s annual agricultural survey. As such, it is a 
nationally representative sample of rural, agriculturally-based households. The survey addressed a broad 
array of grain marketing and food security issues including: grain production and marketing, food aid use, 
impacts of food aid program participation, land ownership and use, household labour and demographics, 
and various farming practices. It also elicited households’ willingness to participate in FFW programs 
under various payment terms. 
7 Similar inertia is observable in food aid flows at the more aggregate level of individual nations (Barrett 
1998, 2001, Barrett and Heisey 2001). 
8 A complicating factor in the case of Ethiopia in 2000 is that several recent studies (Clay et al. 1999, 
Jayne et al. 1999, 2001) had just highlighted the targeting errors associated with food aid distribution in 
Ethiopia, which caused donors to question the efficacy of food aid just as the crisis was beginning. 
9 For example, three kilograms of wheat has been the common daily FFW wage rate in Ethiopia for 
several years, and is above the market wage rate in many places when food prices are high. 
10 In areas of conflict, as in parts of northern Kenya, people would rather hold cash than food because the 
former is far easier to carry in flight. When people have to evacuate on short notice due to civil strife, they 
will carry cash but not food rations they have received. 
11 This may be due in part to the fact that empirical measurement of social capital is fraught with myriad 
conceptual and methodological problems. 
12 We thank Patrick Webb for reminding us of this important issue. 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Labour productivity is computed as total household income (in birr) from farm (value of production) 
and non-farm sources per household unit of labour. Household members aged 15–65 are valued at 1.0 
labour units, while children ages 10–14 and the elderly aged 65 and over are valued at 0.5 labour units.  
